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Re: Keep the Americans out of Kashmir!! Regardless of what they say!



---------------------------------------------------------------------
Please help make the Manifesto better, or accept it, and propagate it!
---------------------------------------------------------------------

Hello Apantik ,
I would endorse the view that Yanks are the only community who have never had
the guile or the gall to play a fair game ever in their entire history post WW
II. Their independence over two hundred years ago has lead them (this
political
generation in particular)to forget what it means to be a normal member of the
world community.They now perceive themselves as 'god's own shit', well
above the
rest of the humanity, & as one who can define the standards for the world. You
must concede to this myopic perspective just for this short while!! For, the
decline of this nation is'nt far away! it has already attained the pinnacle of
'power'-standing as defined by its world's only superpower status & any thing
that has reached the top of the parabola , by physical laws has to descend on
the other side of the climb - viz. descend, & at a pretty fast pace at that
!There is no redeemer in their social fabric that can hope to stem this
descend.
Whilst, the rest of the world is truly on the other side of this sphere( the
otherhemisphere), & merrily climbing away on the up-slope of
acquiring-knowledge-graph. No wonder that they are looking out for one more
avenue to prop up their means to remain aloft/afloat by calling out
participation in the Kashmir tangle, when the two parties(in particular India)
have already repeated umpteen times that no third-party intervention is called
for & nor will it be solicited/tolerated. Mr Coheen / Mrs Albright /Mr
Talbot or
Mr Clintons' statements not withstanding, their only need of the hour is to
take
advantage of Pakistan's weaker position & make a dent in this 'position',
so as
to obtain a 'toe-hold'  for them to enter & claim a 'position' / 'role' in the
peace-process before Clinton & his team retires. It will be a crying shame to
the two dissparate lot of leaders of the two neighbours if they fall prey to
this ploy & enable US to play any role in this arena, where neither has the
US a
contiguous border nor oil to repatriate to it's country in return from this
region.Its direct investments in this region have been no harbringers of peace
&, contrarily, has certainly been instrumental in making this/keeping this
region unstable by sustaining turmoil over the past four decades or more on
one
pretext or the other. South-East-Asia , Europe & earlier-on Japan & the Korean
Pennunsula has already been ravaged by the American meddling in the past.The
sight of the American body-bags from  their past 'other-nation-engagements'
have
deranged the national-psyche to such an extent that they consider it
appropriate
to let the gun-totting killer loose at home, but the same gun in the hands of
the non-yank looms larger than its caliberated calibre & appears as a larger
weapon capable of crushing the Americanised way of life - hence a threat to
US.......... requiring immediate liquidatin by all means !!
Mercifully, as I consider it, the Yanks have no more than a decade before
their
way of  life & politicking would take them downhill at break-neck speed. In
that
will germiinate the breakup of the Anglo-Yank system & growth of the
'Third-world' & its humane way of life , where money & power are brideled by a
societal way of life that is more humane & responsive than what has
prevailed in
their(Yank) region since their birth as a nation. --------Capt
Kiran----------------

apatnaik wrote:

> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> Please help make the Manifesto better, or accept it, and propagate it!
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------
> GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
> Kosovo: The United States Looking For an Exit
> February 7, 2000
> http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/020700.asp
> Summary
> The United States is moving to redefine its policy in Kosovo. The immediate
> reason can be found in the deteriorating situation on the ground. Last week,
> violence intensified between ethnic Albanians and Serbs; this was not
> something that the United States bargained for when it intervened last year.
> For this and a host of other reasons, it appears that Washington is now in
> the process of redefining its role and quite possibly preparing to withdraw
> its forces.
> Analysis
> Increasingly, there are signs that the United States is looking for a way to
> reposition itself in Kosovo, nearly a year after leading NATO forces into a
> conflict over the province. Last week in Europe, U.S. Defense Secretary
> William Cohen suggested that U.S. forces are facing “mission creep” which
> neither military commanders nor political leaders want. In addition, a case
> is building in Washington that blames Europe for doing too little to help
> control Kosovo. And in the last week, the city of Mitrovica in Kosovo has
> been the scene of the very violence and chaos that NATO has always sought to
> avoid.
> Ever since NATO intervened in Kosovo nearly a year ago, one of the most
> interesting exercises has been the attempt of serious analysts and Balkan
> residents to uncover the hidden reason behind the U.S.-led intervention last
> March. The official reason for the conflict was that the United States
> wanted to stop genocide in Kosovo. Particularly in Europe, this was seen as
> a public justification masking a hidden agenda. Theories suggested that
> hidden mines or even the control of the telecommunications industry were the
> true reasons for intervention. An entire industry was spawned to uncover the
> motives behind the two and a half month-long conflict.
> The reality, however, is far more prosaic and, in some ways, more alarming.
> The U.S.-led intervention was prompted precisely by what the U.S. government
> said. There were reports of an impending holocaust in Kosovo. Criticized for
> failing to prevent genocide in Rwanda and accused of sitting idly by in
> Bosnia, the Clinton administration was afraid of another public relations
> nightmare - at a time when domestic scandals were tarnishing the
> administration anyway.
> The administration viewed Kosovo as a low-risk, high-yield operation. The
> administration did not expect an extended conflict, having drawn the belief
> in Bosnia that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was incapable of
> enduring an extended bombing campaign. Expecting a repetition of events in
> Bosnia - when a brief bombing campaign was followed by quick capitulation -
> the administration was caught flat-footed when the war dragged on. The
> United States had been suckered into a war of limited strategic interest
> from which the United States could not withdraw. Milosevic, after all, had
> been portrayed as a monster. And the administration could not negotiate with
> a monster.
> NATO and the United States ultimately engineered a victory, of sorts, last
> June when NATO forces occupied Kosovo. But their arrival did not bring
> anything like closure. Quite to the contrary, the alliance began an
> open-ended occupation in which the mission did not correspond to the reality
> on the ground. The mission of NATO forces was to ensure the security of all
> residents. The reality was that NATO forces were, quite against their
> intentions, acting as the agents of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The
> ethnic Albanian guerrillas used the NATO peacekeeping mission as a means for
> institutionalizing KLA rule in the province. The effect was to turn victims
> into victimizers and NATO peacekeepers into unwitting tools of ethnic
> Albanian revenge.
> In this situation, NATO has never managed to find its balance or its center
> of gravity. NATO troops have managed to alienate all sides - a fact
> underscored by the ongoing violence in Mitrovica. On a larger scale, neither
> Washington nor Brussels had ever faced a simple fact. In the region, the
> prevailing view is that neutral benevolence is impossible; for NATO troops,
> there was no neutral standpoint from which to mount their operation. It was
> inevitable that the peacekeepers would find themselves caught in the
> crossfire between Albanians, determined to keep what they think they have
> won, and Serbs, increasingly determined to recover what they have lost.
> Milosevic remains in control in Belgrade. Nothing has been settled.
> For the United States, the Kosovo experience violates the key lessons of the
> Vietnam experience. Withdrawing from Southeast Asia nearly 20 years ago, the
> United States swore never to again become embroiled, on the ground, in a
> civil war in another country. In Kosovo, the United States has been involved
> in something worse: a civil war that offers no clear exit strategy. The war,
> after all, cannot truly end until one warring ethnic group, or the other, is
> completely expelled from the region. Worse, this civil war is one in which
> the United States has no real stake. In Vietnam, at least, some sort of
> strategic logic could be asserted. But this has not been the case in Kosovo,
> where the driving motive for U.S. involvement has been based on humanitarian
> motives.
> The humanitarian question is now cutting the other way as peacekeepers are
> turned from saviors into confused bullies in the minds of even the
> Albanians. This transformation is not the fault of the troops, who are still
> mostly combat soldiers, trained to respond to threats with overwhelming
> force. Keeping the peace, particularly in a chaotic situation, requires a
> very different sort of training - the sort that is given to police, of which
> there are still precious few in Kosovo.
> More than having the right training, a policeman is someone who is local.
> NATO has taken people who were never trained as police in the first place,
> tossed them into an utterly alien culture - and is now discovering that the
> solution is not working.
> It appears that the administration is slowly recognizing the insanity of the
> situation. In Munich last week, Cohen reportedly said, “I think it has
> reached the level of concern on the part of not only members of the U.S.
> Congress, but military commanders. They are concerned about the possibility
> of mission creep - that the military is being called upon to engage in
> police functions for which they are not properly trained and we don't want
> them to carry out." The administration has acknowledged that the situation
> is getting out of hand, that forces are not trained for the mission and that
> no one now wants them to carry out the mission.
> Most intriguing is Cohen’s reference to mission creep; there has, of course,
> been none. The nature of the mission has remained the same. But
> increasingly, there is perception of creep: the administration’s perception
> has finally caught up with the reality of the mission it so enthusiastically
> undertook nearly a year ago.
> As a result, administration officials and Congress members are looking for
> the exit. Since total withdrawal of NATO forces is impossible without even
> more chaos, another solution is appearing: Blame the Europeans and demand
> that they shoulder more of the burden. Sen. John Warner, chairman of the
> Senate Armed Services Committee, has claimed that the real problem in Kosovo
> is that Europeans have not fulfilled their obligations. They were supposed
> to send police, as well as $35 million for policing functions, but only a
> few of the former and none of the latter have arrived.
> European countries have agreed to take command of the peacekeeping
> operation. By April, a Eurocorps contingent is scheduled to command the
> NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR). More than 350 personnel from the five
> Eurocorps countries - Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain - are
> to take command of the 50,000 troops in Kosovo. This of course does not
> solve the core problem. It may even compound it. The United States,
> desperately wanting to minimize exposure and casualties, will now find its
> forces under the control of a headquarters with its own agenda.
> The Europeans, however, are not eager to undertake full responsibility for
> KFOR. Except for the British government, the rest of Europe was more than a
> little restrained in enthusiasm for the war. Most European governments
> foresaw precisely the situation that has developed. The European view has
> always been that the United States stumbled into a situation for which they
> had counseled caution.
> But there are far deeper issues for European governments at this point. One
> is Russia. The emergence of acting President Vladimir Putin and a much more
> assertive, anti-Western Russia is a result of last year’s war. European
> governments regard the end game of Kosovo, in which the Russians were
> outmaneuvered and humiliated, as a Pyrrhic victory. The Germans in
> particular now must deal with an increasingly truculent Russia - in which
> they have invested billions that they will never again see - and are not
> eager to be the flag-bearers of an operation that continues to irritate the
> Russians.
> Indeed, the Russian factor is likely one reason that the United States wants
> out. Washington’s relationship with Moscow is increasingly dangerous.
> Rhetoric aside, the upcoming Sino-Russian summit in March presents a serious
> threat to global American interests. The United States does not want to see
> a deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship. Instead, Washington needs to
> signal that the U.S. presence in Kosovo does not present a strategic threat
> to the Russians. Beginning the process of withdrawal would help enormously.
> The problem with this strategy is that Europeans are not likely to replace
> Americans as the objects of Russian ire.
> As U.S. troops are caught in the crossfire between Kosovo factions, the
> basic irrationality of the operation becomes apparent. Having entered a
> civil war, the United States lacks both the will and resources to impose a
> settlement. The settlement at hand, a fully Albanian Kosovo, cleansed of
> Serbs, is intolerable. A NATO withdrawal, and the re-entry of the Yugoslav
> Army, is unthinkable. In addition, U.S. forces are strained by their
> dispersal around the globe with little strategic reason.
> An exit from Kosovo will emerge as an issue in the months to come,
> particularly in the context of an American presidential election. The
> Clinton administration is setting the stage for the withdrawal of at least
> some forces from Kosovo, leaving the Europeans to handle it. It is far from
> clear that the Europeans will do it. With both strategic and political
> considerations coinciding, Clinton seems likely to try to trim the military
> commitment in Kosovo. However, having stumbled into it, it is not clear that
> he will now be able to stumble out. Nevertheless, he seems to be cranking up
> to give it his best shot.
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> This is the National Debate on System Reform.       debate@indiapolicy.org
> Rules, Procedures, Archives:          http://www.indiapolicy.org/debate/
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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<html>
Hello Apantik ,
<br>I would endorse the view that Yanks are the only community who have
never had the guile or the gall to play a fair game ever in their entire
history post WW II. Their independence over two hundred years ago has lead
them (this political generation in particular)to forget what it means to
be a normal member of the world community.They now perceive themselves
as 'god's own shit', well above the rest of the humanity, &amp; as one
who can define the standards for the world. You must concede to this myopic
perspective just for this short while!! For, the decline of this nation
is'nt far away! it has already attained the pinnacle of 'power'-standing
as defined by its world's only superpower status &amp; any thing that has
reached the top of the parabola , by physical laws has to descend on the
other side of the climb - viz. descend, &amp; at a pretty fast pace at
that !There is no redeemer in their social fabric that can hope to stem
this descend. Whilst, the rest of the world is truly on the other side
of this sphere( the otherhemisphere), &amp; merrily climbing away on the
up-slope of acquiring-knowledge-graph. No wonder that they are looking
out for one more avenue to prop up their means to remain aloft/afloat by
calling out&nbsp; participation in the Kashmir tangle, when the two parties(in
particular India) have already repeated umpteen times that no third-party
intervention is called for &amp; nor will it be solicited/tolerated. Mr
Coheen / Mrs Albright /Mr Talbot or Mr Clintons' statements not withstanding,
their only need of the hour is to take advantage of Pakistan's weaker position
&amp; make a dent in this 'position', so as to obtain a
<b>'toe-hold'</b>&nbsp;
for them to enter &amp; claim a 'position' / 'role' in the peace-process
before Clinton &amp; his team retires. It will be a crying shame to the
two dissparate lot of leaders of the two neighbours if they fall prey to
this ploy &amp; enable US to play any role in this arena, where neither
has the US a contiguous border nor oil to repatriate to it's country in
return from this region.Its direct investments in this region have been
no harbringers of peace &amp;, contrarily, has certainly been instrumental
in making this/keeping this region unstable by sustaining turmoil over
the past four decades or more on one pretext or the other. South-East-Asia
, Europe &amp; earlier-on Japan &amp; the Korean Pennunsula has already
been ravaged by the American meddling in the past.The sight of the American
body-bags from&nbsp; their past 'other-nation-engagements' have deranged
the national-psyche to such an extent that they consider it appropriate
to let the gun-totting killer loose at home, but the same gun in the hands
of the non-yank looms larger than its caliberated calibre &amp; appears
as a larger weapon capable of crushing the Americanised way of life - hence
a threat to US.......... requiring immediate liquidatin by all means !!
<br>Mercifully, as I consider it, the Yanks have no more than a decade
before their way of&nbsp; life &amp; politicking would take them downhill
at break-neck speed. In that will germiinate the breakup of the Anglo-Yank
system &amp; growth of the 'Third-world' &amp; its humane way of life ,
where money &amp; power are brideled by a societal way of life that is
more humane &amp; responsive than what has prevailed in their(Yank) region
since their birth as a nation. --------Capt Kiran----------------
<p>apatnaik wrote:
<blockquote
TYPE=CITE>------------------------------------------------------------------
---
<br>Please help make the Manifesto better, or accept it, and propagate
it!
<br>---------------------------------------------------------------------
<br>GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
<br>Kosovo: The United States Looking For an Exit
<br>February 7, 2000
<br><a
href="http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/020700.asp">http://www.stratf
or.com/SERVICES/giu2000/020700.asp</a>
<br>Summary
<br>The United States is moving to redefine its policy in Kosovo. The
immediate
<br>reason can be found in the deteriorating situation on the ground. Last
week,
<br>violence intensified between ethnic Albanians and Serbs; this was not
<br>something that the United States bargained for when it intervened last
year.
<br>For this and a host of other reasons, it appears that Washington is
now in
<br>the process of redefining its role and quite possibly preparing to
withdraw
<br>its forces.
<br>Analysis
<br>Increasingly, there are signs that the United States is looking for
a way to
<br>reposition itself in Kosovo, nearly a year after leading NATO forces
into a
<br>conflict over the province. Last week in Europe, U.S. Defense Secretary
<br>William Cohen suggested that U.S. forces are facing “mission creep”
which
<br>neither military commanders nor political leaders want. In addition,
a case
<br>is building in Washington that blames Europe for doing too little to
help
<br>control Kosovo. And in the last week, the city of Mitrovica in Kosovo
has
<br>been the scene of the very violence and chaos that NATO has always
sought to
<br>avoid.
<br>Ever since NATO intervened in Kosovo nearly a year ago, one of the
most
<br>interesting exercises has been the attempt of serious analysts and
Balkan
<br>residents to uncover the hidden reason behind the U.S.-led intervention
last
<br>March. The official reason for the conflict was that the United States
<br>wanted to stop genocide in Kosovo. Particularly in Europe, this was
seen as
<br>a public justification masking a hidden agenda. Theories suggested
that
<br>hidden mines or even the control of the telecommunications industry
were the
<br>true reasons for intervention. An entire industry was spawned to uncover
the
<br>motives behind the two and a half month-long conflict.
<br>The reality, however, is far more prosaic and, in some ways, more
alarming.
<br>The U.S.-led intervention was prompted precisely by what the U.S.
government
<br>said. There were reports of an impending holocaust in Kosovo. Criticized
for
<br>failing to prevent genocide in Rwanda and accused of sitting idly by
in
<br>Bosnia, the Clinton administration was afraid of another public relations
<br>nightmare - at a time when domestic scandals were tarnishing the
<br>administration anyway.
<br>The administration viewed Kosovo as a low-risk, high-yield operation.
The
<br>administration did not expect an extended conflict, having drawn the
belief
<br>in Bosnia that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was incapable
of
<br>enduring an extended bombing campaign. Expecting a repetition of events
in
<br>Bosnia - when a brief bombing campaign was followed by quick capitulation
-
<br>the administration was caught flat-footed when the war dragged on.
The
<br>United States had been suckered into a war of limited strategic interest
<br>from which the United States could not withdraw. Milosevic, after all,
had
<br>been portrayed as a monster. And the administration could not negotiate
with
<br>a monster.
<br>NATO and the United States ultimately engineered a victory, of sorts,
last
<br>June when NATO forces occupied Kosovo. But their arrival did not bring
<br>anything like closure. Quite to the contrary, the alliance began an
<br>open-ended occupation in which the mission did not correspond to the
reality
<br>on the ground. The mission of NATO forces was to ensure the security
of all
<br>residents. The reality was that NATO forces were, quite against their
<br>intentions, acting as the agents of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
The
<br>ethnic Albanian guerrillas used the NATO peacekeeping mission as a
means for
<br>institutionalizing KLA rule in the province. The effect was to turn
victims
<br>into victimizers and NATO peacekeepers into unwitting tools of ethnic
<br>Albanian revenge.
<br>In this situation, NATO has never managed to find its balance or its
center
<br>of gravity. NATO troops have managed to alienate all sides - a fact
<br>underscored by the ongoing violence in Mitrovica. On a larger scale,
neither
<br>Washington nor Brussels had ever faced a simple fact. In the region,
the
<br>prevailing view is that neutral benevolence is impossible; for NATO
troops,
<br>there was no neutral standpoint from which to mount their operation.
It was
<br>inevitable that the peacekeepers would find themselves caught in the
<br>crossfire between Albanians, determined to keep what they think they
have
<br>won, and Serbs, increasingly determined to recover what they have lost.
<br>Milosevic remains in control in Belgrade. Nothing has been settled.
<br>For the United States, the Kosovo experience violates the key lessons
of the
<br>Vietnam experience. Withdrawing from Southeast Asia nearly 20 years
ago, the
<br>United States swore never to again become embroiled, on the ground,
in a
<br>civil war in another country. In Kosovo, the United States has been
involved
<br>in something worse: a civil war that offers no clear exit strategy.
The war,
<br>after all, cannot truly end until one warring ethnic group, or the
other, is
<br>completely expelled from the region. Worse, this civil war is one in
which
<br>the United States has no real stake. In Vietnam, at least, some sort
of
<br>strategic logic could be asserted. But this has not been the case in
Kosovo,
<br>where the driving motive for U.S. involvement has been based on
humanitarian
<br>motives.
<br>The humanitarian question is now cutting the other way as peacekeepers
are
<br>turned from saviors into confused bullies in the minds of even the
<br>Albanians. This transformation is not the fault of the troops, who
are still
<br>mostly combat soldiers, trained to respond to threats with overwhelming
<br>force. Keeping the peace, particularly in a chaotic situation, requires
a
<br>very different sort of training - the sort that is given to police,
of which
<br>there are still precious few in Kosovo.
<br>More than having the right training, a policeman is someone who is
local.
<br>NATO has taken people who were never trained as police in the first
place,
<br>tossed them into an utterly alien culture - and is now discovering
that the
<br>solution is not working.
<br>It appears that the administration is slowly recognizing the insanity
of the
<br>situation. In Munich last week, Cohen reportedly said, “I think it
has
<br>reached the level of concern on the part of not only members of the
U.S.
<br>Congress, but military commanders. They are concerned about the
possibility
<br>of mission creep - that the military is being called upon to engage
in
<br>police functions for which they are not properly trained and we don't
want
<br>them to carry out." The administration has acknowledged that the situation
<br>is getting out of hand, that forces are not trained for the mission
and that
<br>no one now wants them to carry out the mission.
<br>Most intriguing is Cohen’s reference to mission creep; there has, of
course,
<br>been none. The nature of the mission has remained the same. But
<br>increasingly, there is perception of creep: the administration’s
perception
<br>has finally caught up with the reality of the mission it so
enthusiastically
<br>undertook nearly a year ago.
<br>As a result, administration officials and Congress members are looking
for
<br>the exit. Since total withdrawal of NATO forces is impossible without
even
<br>more chaos, another solution is appearing: Blame the Europeans and
demand
<br>that they shoulder more of the burden. Sen. John Warner, chairman of
the
<br>Senate Armed Services Committee, has claimed that the real problem
in Kosovo
<br>is that Europeans have not fulfilled their obligations. They were supposed
<br>to send police, as well as $35 million for policing functions, but
only a
<br>few of the former and none of the latter have arrived.
<br>European countries have agreed to take command of the peacekeeping
<br>operation. By April, a Eurocorps contingent is scheduled to command
the
<br>NATO-led peacekeeping force (KFOR). More than 350 personnel from the
five
<br>Eurocorps countries - Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain
- are
<br>to take command of the 50,000 troops in Kosovo. This of course does
not
<br>solve the core problem. It may even compound it. The United States,
<br>desperately wanting to minimize exposure and casualties, will now find
its
<br>forces under the control of a headquarters with its own agenda.
<br>The Europeans, however, are not eager to undertake full responsibility
for
<br>KFOR. Except for the British government, the rest of Europe was more
than a
<br>little restrained in enthusiasm for the war. Most European governments
<br>foresaw precisely the situation that has developed. The European view
has
<br>always been that the United States stumbled into a situation for which
they
<br>had counseled caution.
<br>But there are far deeper issues for European governments at this point.
One
<br>is Russia. The emergence of acting President Vladimir Putin and a much
more
<br>assertive, anti-Western Russia is a result of last year’s war. European
<br>governments regard the end game of Kosovo, in which the Russians were
<br>outmaneuvered and humiliated, as a Pyrrhic victory. The Germans in
<br>particular now must deal with an increasingly truculent Russia - in
which
<br>they have invested billions that they will never again see - and are
not
<br>eager to be the flag-bearers of an operation that continues to irritate
the
<br>Russians.
<br>Indeed, the Russian factor is likely one reason that the United States
wants
<br>out. Washington’s relationship with Moscow is increasingly dangerous.
<br>Rhetoric aside, the upcoming Sino-Russian summit in March presents
a serious
<br>threat to global American interests. The United States does not want
to see
<br>a deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship. Instead, Washington needs
to
<br>signal that the U.S. presence in Kosovo does not present a strategic
threat
<br>to the Russians. Beginning the process of withdrawal would help
enormously.
<br>The problem with this strategy is that Europeans are not likely to
replace
<br>Americans as the objects of Russian ire.
<br>As U.S. troops are caught in the crossfire between Kosovo factions,
the
<br>basic irrationality of the operation becomes apparent. Having entered
a
<br>civil war, the United States lacks both the will and resources to impose
a
<br>settlement. The settlement at hand, a fully Albanian Kosovo, cleansed
of
<br>Serbs, is intolerable. A NATO withdrawal, and the re-entry of the Yugoslav
<br>Army, is unthinkable. In addition, U.S. forces are strained by their
<br>dispersal around the globe with little strategic reason.
<br>An exit from Kosovo will emerge as an issue in the months to come,
<br>particularly in the context of an American presidential election. The
<br>Clinton administration is setting the stage for the withdrawal of at
least
<br>some forces from Kosovo, leaving the Europeans to handle it. It is
far from
<br>clear that the Europeans will do it. With both strategic and political
<br>considerations coinciding, Clinton seems likely to try to trim the
military
<br>commitment in Kosovo. However, having stumbled into it, it is not clear
that
<br>he will now be able to stumble out. Nevertheless, he seems to be cranking
up
<br>to give it his best shot.
<p>--------------------------------------------------------------------------
<br>This is the National Debate on System
Reform.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
debate@indiapolicy.org
<br>Rules, Procedures,
Archives:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;

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